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1. Impact of Asian crisis on industrial production
% change in industrial production
Prior Prior Following
Country Date of float 5 years 12 months 12 months
Indonesia August 15 76.1 17.3 –18.7
South Korea November 17 53.0 5.4 –4.6
Malaysia July 14 72.2 13.8 –11.6
Philippines July 11 76.8 7.6 –5.8
Thailand July 2 35.5 2.6 –11.6
Sources: Data Resources, Inc. (Thailand, Indonesia); International Financial
Statistics (South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines).
A retrospective on the
Asian Crisis of 1997:
Was it foreseen?
In early July 1997, the Thai baht was
devalued following a speculative attack
by currency traders. The fallout from
this event went far beyond the usual
consequences of speculative curren-
cy attacks. Devaluations followed in
Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and South Korea. In all five countries,
economic activity went into a tailspin.
As shown in figure 1, the declines in
industrial production following the
currency crises were of magnitudes
associated with economic depression.
These declines are especially note-
worthy in light of the extraordinary
economic growth in these countries
during the years preceding the crisis,
demonstrated in the third and fourth
columns of figure 1.
Given the huge collateral damage
to these countries’ economies, most
economists agree that the 1997 crisis
goes well beyond the usual case of an
overvalued currency being forced
by currency traders to realign its ex-
change rate. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology economist Paul Krugman
makes this point forcefully: “[T]he
currency crises were only part of a
broader financial crisis, which had
very little to do with currencies or
even monetary issues per se.”1
In this article, we focus on one impor-
tant piece of the puzzle: “Was the cri-
sis foreseen?” This question is impor-
tant because it may help us decide
between two distinct classes of candi-
date explanations. Following Paul
Krugman, we may call these two can-
didates the “fundamentalist” and “self-
fulfilling” approaches.2
The fundamentalist approach holds
that the crisis resulted from a gradual
accumulation of structural imbalances.
Observers point to accounting prac-
tices that had inadequate transparen-
cy, bank loan decisions being made
for political reasons rather than for
sound economic rationales, and a le-
gal infrastructure inadequate for a
modern capitalist economy. For ex-
ample, at the time of the 1997 crisis
Thailand did not even have a well-
functioning bankruptcy code.3 Even
more strikingly, Indonesia’s bank-
ruptcy law, drafted by the Dutch in
1905, remained unchanged through
1997 and had never even been trans-
lated from Dutch into the native lan-
guage!4 Most notably, the banking
sector in many of these countries had
severe problems, with a vast accumu-
lation of unrecognized bad loans.
The self-fulfilling approach holds
that the crisis ultimately reflected a
reversal in investor beliefs about the
future economic prospects of the crisis
countries. According to this explana-
tion, this reversal in beliefs led inves-
tors to pull capital out of East Asia,
causing the very economic downturn
that the investors feared. In this sense,
the reversal represented a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy.
Which of these two approaches best
explains the events of 1997? A key
piece of evidence is whether the crisis
was foreseen by investors. Under the
fundamentalist approach, the crisis
resulted from years of fundamental
problems. These problems were com-
mon knowledge to investors and were
perceived well before the speculative
attacks that marked the onset of the
full-blown crisis. For example, Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo5 provide ev-
idence that the poor quality of bank
assets was well known months or even
years before the devaluations that
marked the beginning of the crisis.
Investors would have known that as
these problems became worse, the
odds favoring a severe financial crisis
(including a currency devaluation)
were increasing. The model of Burn-
side, Eichenbaum, Rebelo (1998)
implies that the Thai devaluation
could have been foreseen over two
years before the devaluation occurred.
Financial markets would react to the
increased probability of devaluation by
bidding up nominal interest rates and
forward exchange rates (in dollars per
own-currency). We therefore would see
these financial indicators move prior to
the onset of the crisis.
Evidence that the crisis was not fore-
seen by financial markets would repre-
sent a challenge for the fundamentalist
approach. However, it would be easi-
er to reconcile with the self-fulfilling
approach. Investor sentiment is crucial
for generating a self-fulfilling crisis.
A crisis can result if investors switchexchange rate, rupiah/$
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2. Malaysian financial rates

















4. Thai financial rates









Notes: Rates are for January 1996 through December 1997. The
vertical line indicates the date of devaluation.
Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets.
Notes: Rates are for January 1996 through December 1997. The
vertical line indicates the date of devaluation.
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from optimism to pessimism about
future economic prospects. In princi-
ple, there is no reason why such a
shift in sentiment need be foreseen
by financial markets.
Evidence from financial markets
To measure whether the large curren-
cy devaluations were foreseen, we look
at foreign exchange forward rates and
nominal interest rates (denominated
in the Asian countries’ currency). If
investors forecasted an increase in
the probability of a foreign exchange
crisis, these rates would have respond-
ed before the actual beginning of
the crisis.
We use daily data from Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand. We choose
these countries because we were able
to obtain exchange rate and interest
rate data from offshore trading for
these three currencies. The offshore
aspect of these contracts is impor-
tant, since it means that these data
are market based and have not been
manipulated in any way by domestic
authorities. Our data are from
Bloomberg Financial Markets, based
on contracts issued and traded by
Prebon Yamane Asia, an offshore
brokerage firm based in Hong Kong.
The data we use for nominal interest
rates are daily cross-currency interest
rate swap contracts. In an interest rate
swap, one party pays a fixed interest
rate on some principal, or notional,
amount, while the other party pays a
floating rate on the notional amount
that is based on some common quoted
source, such as the six-month LIBOR
(London interbank offered rate).
For a cross-currency interest rate
swap, the fixed rate is paid in one
currency while the floating rate is
paid in a different currency. These
swaps are often used for risk-sharing
purposes, such as when a company
has floating debt outstanding in a
foreign currency that it would like
to replace with fixed-rate payments
in its domestic currency. The price
quotes for the interest rate swap con-
tracts are the fixed semi-annual rate
paid in the domestic Asian currency,
with the six-month U.S. dollar-denom-
inated LIBOR as the floating index
rate. The purchaser of this swap has
conceptually purchased a U.S. dollar
floating rate note and issued a cou-
pon bond denominated in the home
currency.
Any change in market
predictions of future
exchange rates should
be reflected in these
data. If a large future
currency devaluation
was foreseen, the for-
ward exchange rate
should increase, with
an associated rise in the
nominal interest rate.6
Figures 2 through 4
provide evidence on
whether the Asian de-
valuations in 1997 were
foreseen. They plot the
spot exchange rate ver-
sus the U.S. dollar, the
forward currency rates
for delivery in one year,
and the rates from the
one-year swap contracts
over the two-year peri-
od 1996–97. The verti-
cal lines give the date
of devaluation.7
In Malaysia, the forward
exchange rate does not
budge until the specula-
tive attacks on July 12,
two days before the offi-
cial devaluation (figure
2). The interest rate
starts increasing on July
9, only three days prior
to these speculative
attacks and one week




rate nor the interest
rate moves appreciably
from its previous level
until July 11, the date
when the Indonesian
central bank widened
the trading band for
the rupiah (about a
month before the full
devaluation on August
15, indicated by the ver-
tical line in figure 3).
In these countries at least, there is
essentially no evidence that the finan-
cial markets foresaw the onset of
the crisis.In Thailand, financial markets moved
approximately six weeks before the
devaluation date. In particular, the
forward exchange rates started to de-
preciate on May 15 (note the upward
drift in figure 4), while the spot ex-
change rates actually started to appre-
ciate. At that time, the nominal interest
rates also started a pronounced up-
ward movement, reaching levels ex-
ceeding 50% per annum in mid-June.
Does this indicate that financial mar-
kets foresaw the crisis in Thailand (if
only by six weeks)? The evidence sug-
gests not. Rather, the initial increases
in forward rates coincided with the
onset of the crisis. In particular, these
dynamics reflect the strategy chosen
by the Bank of Thailand (BOT) to
defend the baht following intense
speculative attacks starting on May 7.
As documented by Subir Lall of the
International Monetary Fund,8 spec-
ulators launched their attack by tak-
ing short positions in forward baht
contracts. The BOT’s defense was to
squeeze these short positions. From
May 8 through May 14, the BOT took
long positions in forward baht con-
tracts. On May 15, however, it stopped
intervening in the forward market.
This explains the increased forward
baht rates starting on that date that
are evident in figure 4. Rather, it
started squeezing pre-existing short
positions by aggressively raising baht
interest rates (again, evident in figure
4) and by applying severe constraints
on domestic banks’ baht transactions
with off-shore traders. These actions
made it extremely expensive for for-
eign speculators to cover their short
baht positions. The resulting scramble
for baht is reflected in the baht appre-
ciation from May 15 through the end
of June that is apparent in figure 4.
Initially, the BOT’s defense of the baht
appeared quite successful. On May 16,
Therapong Monthienvichienchai,
head of the Asian foreign exchange
department of Deutsche Morgan
Grenfell in Singapore, declared the
BOT a clear winner. “In pushing
interest rates up this high, we can say
that the Bank of Thailand has won the
battle, but of course, not the war.”9
Mr. Therapong’s words proved pro-
phetic. The BOT was able to maintain
its defense for six weeks. However,
the BOT’s strategy could not be
continued indefinitely. It required
extremely high interest rates, cou-
pled with effective segmentation of
the onshore and offshore currency
and swaps markets. Both of these
policies imposed huge costs on do-
mestic Thai businesses (especially
importers). As we know, the defense
was abandoned in early July, at which
point there was no longer any need
to keep interest rates at the extreme
levels of the preceding weeks.
Conclusion
According to the evidence presented
here, the Asian crisis was largely un-
foreseen. There is no evidence in the
offshore currency or interest rate
swaps markets for Thailand, Malaysia,
or Indonesia that investors perceived
an increased risk of devaluation pri-
or to the onset of the crisis. This
represents a substantial challenge
to explanations that focus purely on
economic fundamentals as the key
determinants of financial crises. It
suggests that investors did not inter-
pret the problematic fundamentals
in these countries (pointed to with
the advantage of hindsight by observ-
ers) as precursors of crisis. Rather, it
appears that the state of fundamen-
tals was seen as consistent with con-
tinued economic and financial
strength. This evidence favors the
argument that there was an element
of self-fulfilling prophecy in this cri-
sis. Having said this, it must be noted
that fundamentalist and self-fulfilling
explanations can coexist. It may be
that a self-fulfilling crisis can never
occur if fundamentals are sufficient-
ly strong. If fundamentals are weak,
a self-fulfilling crisis may be possi-
ble, but not inevitable. The actual
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Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Reserve
Board’s Industrial Production Index for the U.S.
manufacturing sector. Autos and light trucks are
measured in annualized units, using seasonal ad-
justments developed by the Board. The purchas-
ing managers’ survey data for the Midwest are
weighted averages of the seasonally adjusted pro-
duction components from the Chicago, Detroit,
and Milwaukee Purchasing Managers’ Association
surveys, with assistance from Kingsbury Interna-
































































The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) rose 0.2% from August
to September, reaching a seasonally adjusted level of 167.5 (1992=100). Revised
data show the index was at 167.2 in August. The Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial
Production Index for manufacturing (IP) increased 0.3% in September.
Auto production decreased from 5.8 million units in September to 5.2 million
units in October, and light truck production also decreased from 6.9 million units
in September to 6.7 million units in October. The Midwest purchasing managers’
composite index (a weighted average of the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee
surveys) for production decreased to 44.1% in November from 51.4% in October.
The purchasing managers’ index decreased in all three surveys. The national
purchasing manager’s survey increased from 48.4% to 49.6% during this period.
Manufacturing output indexes, 1992=100









net % reporting production growth
Nov. Month  ago Year ago
MW 44.1 51.4 62.0
U.S. 49.6 48.4 58.6
Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Oct. Month  ago Year ago
Cars 5.2 5.8 5.7
Light trucks 6.7 6.9 7.1
Manufacturing output indexes
(1992=100)
Sep. Month  ago Year ago
CFMMI 167.5 167.2 156.0
IP 151.8 151.3 142.9